Progressives have saddled themselves with a theory of history that sees the   "march of progress" as an ever upwardly-bound journey to political   perfection: thus the appellation "progressive," as in "things   are getting progressively better." Yet history – real history, that is    – lacks any such teleological plan or direction. It is characterized, instead,   by ups and downs, golden ages and dark ages: the golden age of Greece and Rome   was followed by centuries of ignorance and retrogression that we call – not   without reason – the Dark Ages. And while this characterization is meant to   define the state of a culture in general – its mores, its level of technology,   etc. – we can apply it to any field of human endeavor: e.g. the "golden   age" of invention, the "dark age" of political repression signaled   by the Alien and Sedition Acts – and also to the realm of foreign policy, where   periods of relative peace are interrupted by periodic wars of aggression.
History, in other words, sometimes runs "backwards," and we are entering such a period today in our relations with Russia.
During the first cold war, Russia and the United States were engaged in a worldwide   conflict which the two nuclear-armed protagonists fought via proxies, avoiding   direct encounters but keeping up a constant assault on the other side’s positions.   The Soviets – having basically abandoned their ostensibly revolutionary aims   and retreated to the Stalinist revision of Marxist orthodoxy embodied in the   concept of "socialism in one country" – pursued a mainly defensive   strategy: the Americans, while supposedly set on "containment," often   went beyond this and in several instances attempted to roll back Communist gains   in what we used to call the Third World, e.g. Vietnam, Chile, and the various   unsuccessful attempts to drive Fidel Castro from power.
In the end, the Soviets defeated themselves: their foray into Afghanistan, made in order to prop up a vastly unpopular "People’s Republic," exposed their vaunted military might as a paper tiger, to use Mao’s famous phrase. The demoralization brought on by that defeat combined with an unworkable economic system eventually brought down the Communist colossus – which, in the end, proved to be hollow. 
Until the Great Soviet Implosion of 1989, however, that colossus looked pretty … well, colossal. Right up until the day the Berlin Wall fell, our "intelligence" agencies had no clue as to the huge cracks that were appearing – and widening – in the structure of the Red Empire. Taken by surprise, and fearful of any sort of "instability," the US administration of George Herbert Walker Bush tried to hold back the tide of anti-Communism that swept through eastern Europe like a tsunami, albeit to no avail. 
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